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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RESIDENTIAL AND COMMERCIAL CON- \
STRUCnON COMPANY and THE STATE 1
INSURANCE FUND,
/
Plaintiffs, I
/
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF I
UTAH and GARY LYNN ESKELSON, 1
Defendants. J

^ ^
13230

PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an original proceeding before the aboveentitled Court for the purpose of having the lawfulness
of the Industrial Commission's Order and Award of
August 22, 1972 inquired into and determined pursuant
to 35-1-83 U.CA. 1953, as amended.
DISPOSITION MADE OF THE CASE
BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
After numerous hearings held before the Industrial
Commission of the State of Utah, an order dated August
22, 1972 was entered awarding benefits to the defendant,
Gary Lynn Eskelson, and finding that there was an
accident and that subsequent medical treatment was re-
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lated to said accident. A Petition for Review was filed
pursuant to the Utah Code and the same was denied by
the Industrial Commission.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek to have the Order of August 22, 1972
and the award thereunder reversed by this Court.

DESIGNATION OF PARTIES
The parties will be referred to in this Brief as they
were designated in the hearings below in order that the
same will conform with the transcript of the Industrial
Commission. That is, the defendant, Gary Lynn Eskelson,
will be referred to as applicant and the plaintiff, State
Insurance Fund, will be referred to as defendant and
insurance carrier.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
An application for the adjudication of his claim was
filed by the applicant, Gary Lynn Eskelson, before the
Industrial Commission of Utah and received by said Commission on the 24th day of December, 1970. The application alleged that the applicant sustained an injury by accident in the month of October, 1970. This application,
which was signed by the applicant and his attorney, stated
that the accident occured when the applicant "injured back
in everyday work". (R3). The other documents required
by law to be filed showed the date of injury to be Novem2
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ber 5, 1970. (See Surgical Report filed by the treating
physician {Rl} and Employers First Report of Injury
{R2}.).
A hearing was had on September 2, 1971. (R85).
After the application was read into the record, setting
forth the date of accident occurring on the "— day of
October, 1970" (R86) the applicant was called to testify.
(R87). His counsel asked the following questions and he
responded as follows:
"Q. Now, during the course of this employment,
did you sustain an injury of some type?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. What was that, and when did it happen?
A. I believe the day was November the 5 th, when
I reported the accident. That's what it shows on
the record, I think. I was in my everyday routine,
and about midmorning I noticed that my back
was quite sore. And I didn't want to say anything,
so I worked through the day. And I quit about a
half-hour early that day, and I went and talked
to my boss. He asked me what was the matter, and
I told him I had hurt my back. And at that time I
couldn't hardly straighten up, and I had a hard
time breathing. And he told me that I had better
go see a doctor. That he himself had a bad back,
and he knew what it was like. And he said: 'I don't
want to see' — " (R88 and 89).
The applicant testified that after he had changed
doctors, (R90) he was subsequently admitted to the
Cottonwood Hospital and surgery was performed. (R90).
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On cross-ekamination, inquiry was made as to
whether or not the injury occurred in October or November. The applicant readily admitted that he understood
the nature of the processing of an industrial claim (since
he had claimed benefits concerning a back injury which
had occurred prior to this time) and knew that it was
necessary that there be a proper reporting of the date of
injury. (R94). He then reaffirmed the fact that the application showing that the injury had happened in October
was in error and that the same occurred on November 5,
1972.
The State Insurance Fund moved for admission of
Exhibit " D - l " (R96) and this Exhibit is part of the record.
(R120). This Exhibit was a signed statement by the applicant made prior to the hearing showing the date of injury
to be October 30th. The applicant explained away this
inconsistency by saying that his wife had filled out the
Exhibit in question.
The testimony at the hearing was not only confusing
as to the date of injury, but more particularly, was hazy
as to what activities on the job prompted the injury to
his back. The application and the initial statement of the
applicant was that nothing unusual occurred when the
injury happened and the applicant was "just doing his
everyday routine" when he felt pain. (R88). In fact, on
cross-examination the following question was submitted
to the applicant:
"Q. And it was just when you were doing your
normal duties?
A. Yes, it is." (R95).

4
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The applicant admitted (R10Q) that he did not recall falling and in regards to whether or not any specific
incident occurred, he answered as follows:
"Q- Well, do you remember any specific incident
that prompted pain to your back?
A. Just being a carpenter. (R101).
A. It is just like having a sore leg. One day you
feel good and the next you don't." (R102).
On direct inquiry by counsel, the applicant was unable to relate pain or his injury to any specific incident
of his work activity and specifically denied falling or
twisting his body in an unusual manner. (R116 and 117).
The record is clear that the applicant, prior to either
October or November of 1970, had back difficulties and,
in fact, the applicant admitted that, he had knowledge
that he had a bad back. He testified as follows:
"Q. All right. Now the fact of the matter is that
you claimed to the doctors that your back never did
cure from this incident that you had with the
Wycoff Company; isn't that correct?
A. That's right.
Q. And the fact of the matter is that you told the
doctors, when you went to the hospital, that you
had missed some 15 months of work prior to this
incident that occurred either in October or November of 1970; isn't that correct?
A. That's right.
Q. You knew that you had a bad back, didn't you?
A. Yes." (R102).
5 ,
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The transcript of the prior hearing, alleging an injury
in 1968, was made part of the file in question. (R165).
The industrial claim of the accident in 1968 is not only
important to note that the applicant had a pre-existing
back condition but to show that the haziness as to time of
a specific incident also occurred in the hearing had on
October 14, 1968. The similarity between the applicant's
"confusion" claimed in the present case and in the case
against Wycoff is striking. For example, in the application
in that case there is no specific date alleged.1
The applicant admitted in that case that he had not
fallen or twisted himself in an unusual manner (W21-22)
and that the pain just came on gradually. Counsel for the
insurance carrier, at that time, pointed out the discrepancy
of the date of the accident (R23 and 24) as that reported
by him and the applicant amazingly explained away the
basis of this inconsistency by stating that his wife had
filled out the appropriate documents. (R24).
As stated earlier herein, after the applicant changed
doctors, he was hospitalized and surgery was performed
by Dr. Johnson. In order to delineate the medical questions
as to whether or not the job activities prompted the need
for hospitalization, surgery and the resulting disability,
this matter was sent to a medical panel pursuant to 35-1-77
U.C.A. 1953, as amended. The panel was specifically
asked to comment on what was found during the operative
procedure for the suspected herniated disc that prompted
1

The record of the prior industrial claim was not indexed
concurrendy with the record in this case. For that reason this
file will be referred to as "W".
6
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the operation was found not to be the etiology of the
back at the operation. The medical panel found and there
was no evidence to refute the same, that even assuming
that an accident occurred "the findings of the operation
by Dr. Johnson cannot be reasonably contributed to the
events of November 5, 1970 described by the applicant".
(R130). The panel also found that the defect in the applicant's condition was a congenital condition rather than a
problem brought about by trauma or strain. In this connection, the doctors found as follows:
"5. The panel was asked to comment on the'usual
causes of compression of the lamina or fracture of
bone fragments such as found in this case and
whether or not such findings are consistent with
the history given by the applicant herein'. It is
the panel's experience and believed to be the experience of most orthopedic surgeons that the
fragmented articular facet that is described by
Doctor Johnson is usually congenital or developmental in etiology. It is possible that it could be
caused by trauma, but it would be very unlikely
for it to be caused by the episodes described by the
applicant.
The sharp sacral angle referred to by Doctor
Johnson in the panel's opinion is nothing more
than an acute lumbosacral angle that goes along
with chronic lumbosacral strain, and is the most
likely diagnosis of the applicant's problem."
Notwithstanding the fact that the medical panel
found that the condition of the applicant's pain was not
related to work activities and was rather related to a congenital condition (R157) the Industrial Commission
entered an award for the applicant. This conclusion was
objected to bj^ the defendant (Rl42, 143) and the matter
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was set down to take the testimony of Dr. Wallace Hess,
Chairman of the medical panel. (Rl44). The doctor in his
testimony stated that he felt that Dr. Johnson was justified
in an exploratory operation because of the continued complaints of the applicant. (R157). However, the defect that
was discovered was, according to the panel, "a congenital
anomaly". (R157).
Notwithstanding the fact that the applicant could
describe no specific activity that prompted pain, was confused as to date of injury, was just doing his routine work
and the medical panel found that his defect in his back,
which was long outstanding, was not related to his work
activities, the Industrial Commission found for the applicant and awarded benefits to him.

ARGUMENT
;

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED I N
FINDING T H A T THE APPLICANT, GARY
LYNN ESKELSON, WAS INJURED BY ACCIDENT ARISING O U T OF OR I N THE
COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT

The Utah Workmen's Compensation Act requires
that an injury must be caused "by accident" (35-1-45
U.C.A. 1953, as amended.) It is respectfully submitted,
taking the evidence most favorable to applicant, that
there can be no interpretation of the facts that occurred
in this particular case which could in any manner justify
a finding of "an accident". This Court, on many occasions,
has been called upon to decide whether or not in a par-
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ticular instance the facts justify a conclusion that an
accident occurred. In many instances this issue has been a
knotty one particularly in reference to internal failures
prompted by an unusual exertion or strain. Most of these
cases involve factual situations where the issue is whether
or not the overexertion, or for the matter just exertion,
prompted or aggravated the injury in question. It is not
the position of the State Insurance Fund in this case to
quarrel with or in fact to meet the issues presented with
these fact situations and their results. In this particular
case the only basis for the applicant to receive Workmen's
Compensation benefits is the naked fact that he experienced pain in his back when he was on the job site. This
fact alone does not, we respectfully submit, rise to the
level of constituting "an accident".
This Court, as early as 1929, in construing the compensation act and the requirements for the finding of
"an accident" in Graybar Electric Company, Inc. v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 73 Utah 586, 279 Pacific
161, held as follows:
" W e decided, therefore, that a strain or overexertion may cause accidental injury for which
compensation will be allowed, where the injury
happened suddenly, undesignedly and unexpectedly
at a definite time and place."
In this particular case, the evidence is uncontroverted,
that the applicant cannot relate any instance with any
degree of specificity or definiteness of any activity that was
unusual, sudden or in any manner out of the ordinary.
One can only speculate in light of the testimony of the
date of the alleged injury. In any event, after much prob9
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ing both on direct and cross-examination the applicant's
story is clear, that is, a "bad" back was worsened after
the work of the day doing routine and normal activity.
There was no fall. There was no slipping. There was no
twisting and there is no evidence of any strain or exertion.
The purpose of requiring an incident or event that
has some definiteness is bottomed on sound logic and
justice. A system that would allow for compensation
purely on the happenstance that one felt pain on the job
site would defeat the purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act and would allow a Russian Roulette rule
of where one felt pain to be the key to recovery.
As this Court stated in Redman Warehouse CorporaHon vs. Industrial Commission, 22 U2d 398, 544 P2d 283:
"There is nothing in this record that shows
any unusual event, or 'accident', if you please, justifying compensability within the nature, intent or
spirit of the Workmen's Compensation Act. To
conclude otherwise would insure every truck
driver, every railroad engineer, every airplane
pilot and a lot of others, against a physiological
malfunction or physical collapse of any of hundreds
of human organs, completely unproven as to cause,
but compensable only by virtue of the happenstance that the malfunction, collapse or injury
occurred while the employee was on the job, and
not home or elsewhere."
Another rather recent Utah case in setting forth the
appropriate considerations to be taken in a fact situation
where it appeared the condition came on gradually causing injury is Pintar vs. Industrial Commission, 14 U2d
276, 382 P2d 414. There the Court sustained the non10
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compensability of an accident where the applicant had
suffered two injuries to his back prior to the incident
which required him to discontinue work. Initially, while
timbering in the mine he felt a sharp pain in his back and
again reinjured or hurt his back when he was pushed
against the wall by a drill machine. At a subsequent time,
he went to work as a "roof driver*' and the work activities
caused such pain and distress that he was unable to continue and filed his claim for compensation. The Court
stated:
"It is, therefore, a prerequisite to compensation that his disability be shown to result, not as a
gradual development because of the nature of his
work, but from an identifiable accident or accidents
in the course of his employment/'
Compensation was denied.
Again, see Curling vs. Industrial Commission, 16 U2d
260, 399 P2d 202. The applicant had a hearing impairment that had been developing over the years. The
evidence shows that at a certain day when he was pounding pipes with an air gun for 20 to 30 minutes he noted
suddenly that other noises around him dulled. The Court
stated that an accident did not occur notwithstanding the
fact that the record supported the proposition that there
was a single incident for an injury must be of a type that
"it connotates an unanticipated, unintended occurrence
different than that experienced in the normal course of
events". The Court went on to state that if an injury
occurs from a gradually developing condition, the injury
cannot be compensated unless, specifically, classified and
claimed as a occupational disease. (See 35-2-1 et. seq.
U.C.A., 1953, as amended).
11
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Cited earlier was a recent case Redman Warehouse
Corporation vs. Industrial Commission, supra. This case
cited both Pintar vs. Industrial Commission, supra, and
Carling vs. Industrial Commission, supra, in reversing the
Industrial Commission's award of compensation on the
grounds, that is a matter of law, the applicant failed to
sustain his burden of proof in his claim of that "an accident" occurred.
The "accident" in Redman causing the back injury
to the applicant occurred because of the herniation of a
disc when the truck driver was engaged in his business
of driving from Salt Lake City to San Francisco. During
the drive, when he was doing his normal business, his back
worsened necessitating hospitalization. The Court, explaining that this was the same type of work he had done
for eleven years, noted that there was no specific incident.
The Court stated that there was a
".. .complete absence of competent proof here
to support any finding with respect to the cause
of the rupture saved by guess work . . . the claimant has not made the onus of proving a "accident"
in the course of his employment that "caused" the
"injury" of which he complains, which burden
is his."
It would appear that in this particular case, the defendant's position is much stronger than the position of
the defendant in the Redman case for the reason that the
medical testimony does not relate the job activities to
the resulting etiology of the back. In Mellen vs. Industrial
Commission, 19 U2d 373, 431 P2d 798, this Court has
quoted with approal the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
12!
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Wolf in Purity Biscuit Company vs. Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 P2d 969 which sets forth the quantum of proof that is necessary in cases involving internal
failure that is claimed to be work related, his opinion in
part is as follows:
"From time to time we shall encounter difficulty
in determining whether the commission acted unreasonably or arbitrarily in those doubtful cases
above mentioned. It is not so much the principles
laid down in the prevailing opinion as it is the
nature of the proof with which I am concerned.
In this type of case we are dealing with situations
involving death or disability which situations may,
due to a functional failure, occure by reason of the
work or may be purely coincidental with it. Where
the death or disability occurs under such circumstances as to present prima facia doubt as whether
it was caused by exertion incidental to the work,
or an event which occurred only in the duration
of the work and in regard to which the work
furnished no material or efficient concurring or
cooperating cause, then, before a favorable award
is made, it should appear by clear and convincing
evidence that the exertion in pursuance of the
work was at least an efficient cooperating cause
of the disability or death. The commission should
have clear and convincing proof that the exertion
done as a part of the work, whether ordinary or
extraordinary, was a factor which materially contributed to or caused the death or disability. Unless the commission requires clear and convincing
proof that the disability was employment connected, that is, materially contributed to by the
work performed, we may open wide the door to
compensating nonemployment connected death or
disabilities which the act was not intended to
cover".
13
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Not only is there no clear and convincing evidence
here that the work activities caused the disability of the
applicant, the medical evidence is directly to the contrary.

CONCLUSION
The Industrial Commission's Order should be overturned in this case because the record clearly indicated
that the only claim for compensation is the mere fact
that pain was experienced on the job site. To award compensation under these conditions is to ignore the statutory
requirement of "an accident".
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT D. MOORE, of
Rawlings, Roberts & Black
400 Ten Broadway Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Residential and Commercial
Construction Company and
The State Insurance Fund
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